Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol

Reporting cited here

1. reported

   Trump publicly selected Mike Pence as the Republican vice-presidential nominee on July 15, 2016. Pence supplied executive and congressional experience and support among social conservatives. The nomination established the running-mate relationship that later placed Pence in the constitutional presiding role for the 2021 electoral count.

   Pence's vice-presidential presiding role during the January 6 electoral count

   Trump selects Indiana governor Mike Pence as his running mate · Former vice president and former running mate

2. documented

   Donald Trump Jr. forwarded Meadows a proposal for Republican-controlled state legislatures to substitute Trump electors and force the contest into Congress. Meadows replied that he was already working on it for Pennsylvania, Georgia, and North Carolina, then exchanged similar messages with legislators. The committee treated this as contemporaneous evidence that the White House chief of staff joined the state-level reversal track immediately after election day.

   Chapter 2, pages 266–268: November 5 text and related Meadows exchanges

   Meadows says he is already working on legislatures appointing Trump electors · Documented in Meadows text production

3. documented

   At the Trump campaign's Four Seasons Total Landscaping event, Giuliani asserted that Trump had won Pennsylvania and announced election litigation. The January 6 report later placed the presentation within a campaign of claims that campaign and Justice Department officials repeatedly found unsupported. Giuliani thereby became the lead public representative of Trump's election-reversal effort.

   Chapter 1, Pennsylvania chronology: November 7 Four Seasons Total Landscaping press conference and unsupported fraud claims

   Giuliani launches Trump's post-election litigation campaign at Four Seasons Total Landscaping · Claims rejected by the certified Pennsylvania result and later court record

4. documented

   Giuliani led a Trump campaign press conference alleging coordinated election fraud across multiple states. The January 6 report documented that senior campaign staff, the Justice Department, and courts rejected the material claims, while Giuliani continued advancing them. The significance is not the mere existence of political speech but its role in sustaining pressure after responsible officials reported no outcome-changing fraud.

   Chapter 1, pages 210–229: campaign fraud claims, November 19 press conference, and contrary findings

   Giuliani and Trump lawyers allege a nationwide election conspiracy without substantiating it · Allegations remained unsupported in the cited investigative record

5. documented

   Meadows received and forwarded a Kenneth Chesebro memorandum addressing alternate electors and asked campaign personnel whether the effort was being coordinated. The committee found the plan ultimately generated certificates from states Trump had lost for potential use on January 6. Meadows acted as a White House conduit for the operation; the committee's finding was not a criminal conviction.

   Chapter 3, pages 345–357: Chesebro memoranda, Meadows forwarding, and campaign coordination

   Meadows forwards the Chesebro elector memorandum and asks for coordination · Documented by messages reviewed by the January 6 committee

6. documented

   The January 6 committee found that by December 13 or 14 Trump was driving the alternate-elector plan and collaborating with Giuliani on implementation, even though certified electors had been determined under state law. The plan created documents purporting to cast electoral votes for Trump for use in the congressional count. Later state charges had their own legal outcomes; the committee finding established coordination, not guilt on those charges.

   Chapter 3, pages 341–377: Trump-Giuliani implementation and December 14 elector meetings

   Trump and Giuliani move from researching alternate electors to implementing the plan · Documented congressional finding; later state prosecutions had separate dispositions

7. documented

   Flynn publicly said Trump could deploy the military to battleground states and rerun the election, invoking disputed historical precedent. The next day he joined the Oval Office confrontation over seizing voting machines and other proposals. No martial-law order or military-run election occurred. The institutional concern is the proposed use of armed state power to displace certified civilian election processes.

   Chapter 6, pages 510–523: Flynn's public proposal, December 18 participants, military discussion, and non-adoption

   Flynn publicly urges military deployment and a new election in battleground states · Proposal not adopted; Flynn joined the December 18 Oval Office meeting

8. documented

   Giuliani and Michael Flynn participated in the December 18 White House meeting where Sidney Powell and others pressed to seize voting machines, appoint Powell special counsel, and continue efforts to overturn certified results. White House lawyers forcefully opposed the proposals, and no seizure order was executed. Former and private advisers had direct Oval Office access to seek extraordinary state action for Trump's political objective.

   Chapter 6, pages 510–523: December 18 meeting, participants, proposals, opposition, and non-adoption

   Giuliani and Flynn join the December 18 Oval Office confrontation over overturning the result · Proposals were not adopted; meeting documented by the January 6 committee

9. documented

   Meadows traveled to Cobb County during an absentee-ballot signature audit, spoke with Deputy Secretary of State Jordan Fuchs and chief investigator Frances Watson, and later connected Watson with Trump. On the recorded call, Trump claimed he had won and told Watson she would be praised when the 'right answer' came out. The intervention placed White House power directly against state election administration.

   Chapter 2, pages 291–293: Meadows visit, officials contacted, and recorded Trump-Watson call

   Meadows makes an unannounced visit to Georgia's Cobb County ballot audit · Audit completed; Georgia's certified result did not change

10. documented

    Four days after his audit visit, Meadows asked Georgia Deputy Secretary of State Jordan Fuchs whether Fulton County signature verification could be sped up before January 6 if the Trump campaign assisted financially. The message joined a federal official's access, a campaign funding offer, and a desired election timetable. No cited evidence establishes that Georgia accepted money or altered the result.

    Chapter 2, pages 291–292: Meadows text offering Trump campaign financial assistance

    Meadows asks whether Trump campaign funding can accelerate Fulton County verification · Request documented; certified Georgia result remained unchanged

11. documented

    Between December 26 and 28, Representative Scott Perry repeatedly pressed Meadows to elevate Jeffrey Clark, emphasizing the shrinking time before January 6. Clark had bypassed Justice Department contact rules and was preparing a letter falsely claiming the department had significant election concerns. Meadows replied that he would work on the deputy position. The episode tied White House staffing power to pressure on law enforcement's election findings.

    Executive Summary pages 49–53 and Chapter 4: Perry-Meadows texts, Clark contacts, and false draft letter

    Meadows becomes the White House channel for pressure to elevate Jeffrey Clark · Clark was not installed after Justice Department leadership threatened mass resignation

12. documented

    Meadows transmitted to acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen a draft lawsuit that would have put the Justice Department behind an effort to invalidate certified election results. Rosen and acting deputy Richard Donoghue rejected it as unsupported and outside the department's role. The failed request is institutionally significant because it sought the credibility and coercive authority of federal law enforcement for Trump's private electoral objective.

    Chapter 4, pages 394–399: draft Supreme Court complaint, Meadows transmission, and Justice Department rejection

    Meadows sends Justice Department a draft Supreme Court election lawsuit · Justice Department refused to file the proposed suit

13. documented

    Meadows sent Rosen a video and messages alleging Italian satellites had switched Trump votes, requested an investigation, and helped arrange contact with the claim's proponents. Justice officials had the FBI assess the allegation and found it not credible. The referrals consumed federal investigative resources on an unsupported claim while presidential staff sought a basis to challenge the certified result.

    Chapter 4, pages 393–401: Italygate referrals, FBI assessment, and repeated White House requests

    Meadows repeatedly forwards the debunked Italygate claim to Justice leadership · FBI and Justice Department found the allegation not credible

14. documented

    After repeated efforts to connect Trump with Brad Raffensperger, Meadows joined the recorded January 2 call. Trump demanded that Georgia 'find 11,780 votes' and suggested criminal exposure while Raffensperger and counsel corrected his claims. The committee identified the demand as an outright request for victory; the later Georgia prosecution ended without a merits verdict.

    Chapter 2, pages 292–300: Meadows role arranging the call, transcript, rebuttals, and vote demand

    Meadows joins Trump's call demanding that Georgia 'find' enough votes to win · Georgia did not change its certified result

15. documented

    Navarro later wrote that his Green Bay Sweep role was to document asserted fraud and irregularities while Bannon devised how to use the material, with Pence expected to delay certification. The January 6 committee found the plan's goal was to overturn the result and that either envisioned Pence action would have been illegal. Navarro supplied that account of his own role; it is not inferred from mere proximity.

    Chapter 5, pages 454–456: Navarro's account, division of roles, Pence pressure, and legal conclusion

    Navarro describes his role in Bannon's Green Bay Sweep · Plan failed; underlying election-fraud premise was not substantiated

16. documented

    Trump, Pence, John Eastman, Marc Short, and Greg Jacob met in the Oval Office. Jacob testified that Eastman acknowledged both proposed paths—rejecting electoral votes or delaying the count—conflicted with the Electoral Count Act. Trump nevertheless continued pressing Pence. The illegality assessment came from Pence's counsel and was acknowledged by the plan's author before the requested act.

    Executive Summary pages 31–33: January 4 meeting, Jacob memorandum, and Eastman acknowledgment

    Trump presses Pence in an Oval Office meeting after Eastman concedes statutory violations · Pence rejected the proposal; Congress later counted the certified votes

17. documented

    The January 6 committee found that Bannon spoke with Trump at least twice on January 5, then used his broadcast to berate Pence and demand that he 'run the play.' Navarro described the Green Bay Sweep as a plan in which Pence would delay certification while Bannon used asserted fraud claims. The report concluded the intended end state was to overturn the election result.

    Chapter 5, pages 454–456: Trump calls, broadcast statements, Navarro account, and plan end states

    Bannon coordinates with Trump and publicly demands that Pence 'run the play' · Plan failed when Pence refused to delay or reject certified votes

18. documented

    Meadows told Roger Stone associate Michael Glassner that the National Guard would be present to 'protect pro Trump people' and that more would be available on standby. The January 6 committee found no evidence Trump ordered 10,000 or 20,000 Guard troops for the Capitol. The message documents Meadows' framing; it is not proof of a Guard deployment order.

    Chapter 6, security planning and footnotes around page 536: Meadows message and absence of a 10,000-troop order

    Meadows says the National Guard will protect pro-Trump people on January 6 · Committee found no Trump order to deploy 10,000 Guard troops

19. documented

    Members and associates of the Oath Keepers served as Stone's security detail at Washington events and his hotel on January 5 and 6. The committee documented contacts and photographs while noting gaps in Stone's testimony and communications. The evidence establishes operational proximity to people later convicted in January 6 cases, but not that Stone knew their plans or directed violence.

    Chapter 6, pages 536–548: Stone security detail, photographs, messages, and limits of evidence

    Oath Keepers provide Stone security immediately before January 6 · Contact documented; no charge against Stone for January 6 attack planning

20. documented

    By January 5, Pence had repeatedly told Trump that the vice president lacked authority to change the election result and had only a ministerial role in the count. Conservative former judge Michael Luttig and every White House lawyer identified in the committee record agreed. Trump therefore had repeated notice of the constitutional and statutory objection before his public pressure intensified.

    Executive Summary pages 32–35: Short testimony, Luttig assessment, and White House lawyers' views

    Pence repeatedly tells Trump the vice president lacks unilateral election power · Position carried into Pence's January 6 public letter

21. documented

    After reporting revealed Pence had told Trump he lacked authority to block certification, Trump dictated a statement asserting that he and Pence were in 'total agreement' that Pence could act. The January 6 committee found the statement false. It publicly misrepresented the vice president's position and primed supporters to treat a lawful refusal as betrayal.

    Executive Summary page 35: New York Times report, dictated statement, and committee finding that it was false

    Trump falsely says Pence agrees he can change the election outcome · January 6 committee found the statement false

22. documented

    The committee compiled contemporaneous video and defendant accounts showing that word of Pence's refusal spread through the crowd, produced chants of 'Hang Mike Pence,' and helped motivate some participants to enter the Capitol. The report attributes specific statements to recorded speakers and defendants; it does not impute the threats to every person at the rally.

    Executive Summary pages 37–38: crowd recordings, defendant accounts, and threat chants

    Crowd turns on Pence after learning he will not reject certified votes · Threat documented; no inference that every attendee joined it

23. reported

    The House Select Committee reported that Trump summoned supporters to Washington, spoke at the Ellipse and directed them to march to the Capitol. This source-attributed congressional finding supplies the relationship to the attack whose public costs GAO estimated; it is not encoded as a criminal judgment.

    Executive Summary pages 1–6; Chapter 6, pages 583–592

    GAO estimates the January 6 Capitol attack caused about $2.7 billion in costs · Retrospective government estimate; component scope and limitations remain attached

24. documented

    Giuliani left a voicemail intended for Senator Tommy Tuberville asking that objections be used to slow the electoral count, and later reached members after Congress reconvened to encourage continued objections. The January 6 committee documented the calls as a continuation of Trump's effort to prevent or delay the lawful transfer even after the violent interruption.

    Executive Summary pages 114–115 and Chapter 7: Giuliani calls and testimony about seeking continued objections

    Giuliani calls senators after the Capitol attack to seek further electoral-count delay · Congress completed the count despite the requested delay

25. reported
    Superseded · open corrected record

    The House January 6 committee reported that on 2021-01-06, Donald Trump corruptly pressured Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to count electoral votes despite being told Pence lacked that authority.

    Executive summary and Chapter 5

    January 6 committee found Trump knowingly pressured Pence to reject electoral votes · superseded evidence record

26. documented

    From 2:32 through 3:58 p.m., Meadows received messages from administration alumni, members of Congress, Fox hosts, and Donald Trump Jr. demanding that Trump tell supporters to leave. Cassidy Hutchinson testified that Meadows said Trump did not want to do anything as counsel warned people could die. Cipollone said Meadows ultimately joined staff urging a stronger message, placing his initial delay and later support for intervention in the same sequence.

    Executive Summary pages 78–85: Meadows office testimony, timestamped messages, and Cipollone's account

    Meadows receives a cascade of pleas to make Trump stop the Capitol attack · Attack continued until Trump released a go-home video at 4:17 p.m.

27. documented

    The House January 6 committee reported that on 2021-01-06, Donald Trump corruptly pressured Vice President Mike Pence to refuse to count electoral votes despite being told Pence lacked that authority.

    Executive summary and Chapter 5

    Pence pressure finding was never tried after the federal case was dismissed under presidency policy · Congressional finding stands; related federal charge dismissed without prejudice before trial.

28. documented

    Before the joint session, Pence released a letter stating that his oath prevented him from claiming unilateral authority to decide which electoral votes counted. The position matched the advice of his counsel and conservative judge Michael Luttig. It was the formal institutional break: Pence chose the constitutional presiding role over Trump's personal directive.

    Executive Summary pages 31–38 and Chapter 5: Pence legal position and January 6 letter

    Pence publicly states he has no unilateral authority to reject electoral votes · Pence followed the position when Congress reconvened

29. reported

    The January 6 Select Committee found that Donald Trump pressured Vice President Mike Pence to reject or delay certified electoral votes and that Pence refused, concluding that he lacked such authority.

    Final Report, Chapter 5

    Pence resists Trump's pressure over electoral votes · Pence refused Trump's electoral-count demand on January 6, 2021

30. documented

    The Secret Service moved Pence from the Senate floor and then from his ceremonial office to a secure loading area. The committee found the evacuation route missed the advancing mob by roughly 40 feet; radio traffic showed agents feared for their lives and made family goodbyes. The harm was concrete: constitutional proceedings stopped and Pence's security team faced an acute threat.

    Executive Summary pages 38–39 and 85–87: evacuation timing, distance, and security-radio testimony

    Secret Service evacuates Pence and his family, missing the mob by about 40 feet · Evacuated safely; returned to complete the count

31. documented

    After Pence refused by phone, Trump directed speechwriters to restore language targeting him and went off script five times to demand that Pence act, despite a White House lawyer's objection to the legal theory. The committee found the remarks produced substantial anger in the crowd, escalating the private pressure campaign into a public loyalty test.

    Executive Summary pages 36–37: speech edits, five off-script references, and crowd response

    Trump adds five off-script demands for Pence to his Ellipse speech · Committee linked the statements to immediate crowd anger against Pence

32. documented

    At 2:24 p.m., after being informed of violence and after the Secret Service began moving Pence, Trump posted that Pence lacked courage. The committee documented an immediate surge, spread of the message inside the Capitol, and a police-line breach at 2:35. The evidence establishes that sequence and immediate response, not sole causation for every later act of violence.

    Executive Summary pages 38–39: notice of violence, 2:24 post, spread, surge, and 2:35 line breach

    Trump attacks Pence at 2:24 p.m. after learning violence is underway · January 6 committee documented timing and crowd consequences

33. documented

    In the late-morning call, Trump again claimed Pence could send votes back. Witnesses said Trump called Pence a 'wimp,' said certification would be a 'political career killer,' and used a vulgar insult relayed by Ivanka Trump's chief of staff. Pence again refused. The sequence shows direct personal and career pressure after Trump had been told the requested act lacked legal authority.

    Executive Summary pages 35–36: call, witness accounts, threats, insults, and Pence refusal

    Trump insults and threatens Pence's political career when Pence refuses · Pence maintained his refusal

34. documented

    At 1:00 a.m. and 8:17 a.m., Trump publicly asserted that Pence could send electoral votes back to states and thereby make Trump win. The claim conflicted with advice Trump had received from Pence, Pence's counsel, White House counsel, and Eastman's own concessions. The posts converted a rejected legal theory into a loyalty demand directed at the sitting vice president.

    Executive Summary page 35: 1:00 a.m. and 8:17 a.m. posts and prior legal notice

    Trump tells supporters that Pence alone can secure a second Trump term · Demand rejected as outside the vice president's authority

35. documented

    Pence returned to the Senate chamber, reconvened the joint session, and presided as Congress completed the electoral count. He rejected requests to leave the Capitol or delay the count and announced the certified totals establishing Biden's victory, completing the constitutional process Trump's pressure campaign had sought to prevent.

    Chapter 8 and conclusion: Pence refusal to leave, reconvening, and completion of count at 3:44 a.m.

    Pence reconvenes the joint session and completes the electoral count · Electoral count completed and result certified

36. documented

    The House January 6 committee subpoenaed Meadows for documents and deposition testimony concerning election-reversal activity and the attack. Meadows initially produced thousands of pages, including text messages, while asserting privileges over other material. The partial production yielded primary communications underlying multiple findings about White House conduct before and during January 6.

    Executive Summary pages 118–120 and Meadows production citations throughout report

    January 6 committee subpoenas Meadows for records and testimony · Meadows produced selected messages but ultimately refused to testify

37. documented

    After negotiating and producing selected records, Meadows notified the committee that he would not appear for deposition and categorically withheld testimony. He asserted executive privilege and absolute immunity, including over messages already produced. The committee rejected a blanket refusal because a witness must appear and assert particular privileges question by question.

    Executive Summary pages 118–120 and Chapter 7: partial production, privilege claims, and categorical refusal

    Meadows reverses course and refuses the January 6 committee deposition · Refusal produced a House contempt vote; Justice later declined prosecution

38. documented

    The House voted to hold Meadows in criminal contempt and referred the matter to the Justice Department after he refused deposition testimony. The January 6 committee characterized the subpoena as lawful and his blanket noncompliance as damaging Congress's investigative authority. A congressional contempt referral initiates a prosecutorial decision; it is not itself a criminal judgment.

    Executive Summary pages 118–120 and note 688: House vote and legal characterization

    House votes to hold Meadows in contempt for defying the committee subpoena · Criminal referral not prosecuted

39. documented

    Stone said he invoked the Fifth Amendment to each substantive question in his January 6 committee deposition and refused to produce requested documents. He called the inquiry political. The committee later stated it did not rely on adverse inferences from Stone or other witnesses invoking the constitutional privilege, so the invocation is not encoded as evidence of guilt.

    Executive Summary pages 117–119: named Fifth Amendment witnesses and committee no-adverse-inference statement

    Stone invokes the Fifth Amendment throughout January 6 committee deposition · Deposition completed without substantive testimony

40. dismissed

    The Justice Department notified House counsel that it would not prosecute Meadows for contempt of Congress. The department did not publicly state its reasons. Unlike Bannon and Navarro, who were charged and convicted for subpoena defaults, Meadows faced no criminal contempt case from the House referral.

    Executive Summary pages 119–120: declination and committee statement that reasons were not apparent

    Justice Department declines to prosecute Meadows for contempt of Congress · No criminal contempt prosecution