Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5

Claims supported by this source

1. factdocumented

   After Manafort met Kilimnik on May 7, Rick Gates believed Manafort began directing him to transmit internal Trump campaign polling and updates to Kilimnik on a recurring basis, using encrypted messages and deleting some communications. The Senate Intelligence Committee identified Kilimnik as a Russian intelligence officer and deemed Manafort's access and information sharing a grave counterintelligence threat. Investigators could not determine Kilimnik's ultimate use of the data.

   Pages 69–81 and executive findings: May 7 meeting, Gates' account of recurring polling transfers, Kilimnik assessment, and evidentiary limits

   After a May 7 meeting, Manafort directs recurring internal-poll transfers to Kilimnik · Transfer established; downstream use of the polling not determined

2. factdocumented

   The Senate Intelligence Committee found that after WikiLeaks released Democratic emails on July 22, Trump directed campaign officials to stay in touch with Stone about WikiLeaks and Manafort tasked Stone with obtaining advance information. The committee distinguished its evidence from proof that Stone controlled WikiLeaks, possessed authentic nonpublic knowledge, or participated in the Russian hacking operation.

   Roger Stone and WikiLeaks section, pages 221–232: post-July 22 Trump direction, Manafort tasking, communications, and evidentiary limits

   After WikiLeaks' July 22 release, Trump tells campaign officials to use Stone as their information channel · Congressional finding; Stone later convicted for obstruction and false statements concerning the inquiry

3. factdocumented

   At New York's Grand Havana Room, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on Trump campaign strategy and battleground polling, discussed money Manafort believed he was owed, and heard a Ukraine peace plan requiring Trump's future support. The Mueller report said the peace-plan discussion and data purpose remained partly unresolved and did not establish campaign coordination with the Russian government; the Senate later assessed the access as a grave security threat.

   Manafort section, pages 28–149: meeting reconstruction and counterintelligence assessment

   Manafort briefs Kilimnik on campaign strategy and discusses a Ukraine peace plan · Meeting documented; special counsel did not establish an election-coordination agreement

4. factdocumented

   Rick Gates testified that on the way to LaGuardia Airport on September 29 he saw Trump take a call from Stone and afterward heard Trump say more damaging information would be released. Phone records showed multiple Trump-Stone contacts in relevant periods. The Senate committee assessed that Trump spoke with Stone about WikiLeaks, while Trump's sworn written answers said he did not recall discussing WikiLeaks with Stone. The conflicting account remains explicit.

   Pages 223–252: phone evidence, witness accounts, and committee assessment

   Gates witnesses a September 29 Trump-Stone call followed by a WikiLeaks forecast · Committee credited witness and phone evidence; Trump said he did not recall the conversations

5. factdocumented

   Gates testified at Stone's trial that he witnessed a Trump-Stone phone call and then heard Trump say more damaging WikiLeaks releases were coming. Phone records corroborated contacts but not call content. Trump had answered the special counsel that he did not recall discussing WikiLeaks with Stone; no court found that answer false.

   Stone section, pages 223–252: Gates trial testimony, phone records, and Trump written answers

   Gates testifies that Trump discussed WikiLeaks with Stone during the campaign · Stone proceeding credited the testimony; Trump submitted a contrary lack-of-recollection answer

6. factdocumented

   The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that Manafort's high-level Trump campaign access and willingness to share information with people closely affiliated with Russian intelligence—especially Kilimnik and associates of Oleg Deripaska—represented a grave counterintelligence threat. The committee also documented evidentiary gaps caused by deleted communications and Manafort's lies, and did not claim it could determine every downstream use of polling data.

   Executive findings pages vii–viii and Manafort section pages 1–149

   Bipartisan Senate committee calls Manafort a grave counterintelligence threat · Formal bipartisan congressional assessment